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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents represented Justin and Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC 
(collecti vel y "Appellants") in a transaction in which they wished to purchase certain real 
property located in Ada County, Idaho, commonly known as the Dunham Place Subdivision 
("the Property") from Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar"). (R. p. 70). 
On July 21,2006, Appellants and the principals of Quasar entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement ("the Agreement") whereby Appellants agreed to purchase the Property 
from Quasar under certain terms and conditions. Id. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Appellants deposited $60,000 as earnest money, 
to be applied toward the purchase price for the Property, in the event the parties closed the 
transaction under the terms of the Agreement. Id. 
Section 7(a) ofthe Agreement provided that in the event Quasar failed to record the final 
plat for the Property by July 31,2007, Appellants had the right to terminate the Agreement and 
seek a full refund ofthe earnest money. Id. 
Quasar failed to record the plat for the Property by July 31, 2007. (R. pp 70-71). On that 
same date, Mr. Krueck on behalf of Appellants provided written notice to counsel for Quasar that 
Appellants terminated the Agreement due to Quasar's failure to record the plat pursuant to the 
terms ofthe Agreement, and also demanded a full refund of the $60,000 paid in earnest money. 
Id. Quasar did not refund the Appellants' earnest money in response to this demand. 
Respondents, on behalf of Appellants, sent several letters to counsel for Quasar 
demanding refund ofthe earnest money pursuant to the terms ofthe Agreement. (R. p. 71). 
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On September 6,2007, Respondents received a letter from counsel for Quasar, along with 
a proposed promissory note and release agreement, which proposed promissory note provided 
that Quasar would pay Appellants, or Sunrise Development, LLC, $60,000 no later than 
September 17, 2007. Id. The parties could not reach a resolution regarding the terms of the 
proposed promissory note and release agreement, and no payment was ever made by Quasar. Id. 
On September 25, 2007, Respondents filed on behalf of Appellants, a Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Sunrise Development, LLC v. Quasar Development, LLC, Ada 
County Case No. CV OC 0717098 (the "Underlying Litigation"). (R. pp. 71-72). 
In the Complaint, Appellants asserted that Quasar was obligated under the terms of the 
Agreement to fully refund the earnest money to Reynolds on July 31,2007. (R. p. 54 ). 
Appellants also asserted that they "had been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, 
including but not limited to, the amount of the Earnest Money deposit and other incidental and 
consequential damages ... " (R. p. 55) (emphasis added). 
On December 4, 2007, Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment. On that same 
date, the Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds ("Appellant") in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed. (R. pp. 63-65). In that affidavit, Ms. Reynolds confirmed that "Sunrise has 
made numerous written demands to Quasar seeking a refund of the Earnest Money pursuant to 
the express terms ofthe Agreement." (R. p. 64) 
Judge Darla Williamson entered an Order on Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on March 11,2008. See Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Order"), Appendix A of the Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S. Reynolds in Opposition to Motion 
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for Summary Judgment, see Order Granting Stipulated Motion to Augment Record, entered 
October 19, 2011. 
In the Order, Judge Williamson granted Appellants' motion regarding the amount due to 
be refunded (the $60,000), but denied the motion regarding the timing of the payment of the 
refund, finding that the refund must be made in a reasonable time and that there was an issue of 
fact whether or not a reasonable time had past for the refund to be made. [d. 
Appellants incurred substantial attorney fees associated with Quasar's failure to refund 
the earnest money upon their termination of the Agreement on July 31,2007; until the litigation 
was filed, and thereafter, in eventually reaching another settlement with Quasar. Appellants filed 
a complaint for malpractice against Respondents on March 9, 2010. 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred in holding that the Complaint was barred by applicable 
statute of limitations. 
Whether, in the event that Respondents are the prevailing party on this appeal, they are 
entitled to attorney fees in defending this appeal. 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as there existed a 
contractual and/or commercial relationship between Respondents and Appellants. Ifthe District 
Court decision is affirmed on appeal, Respondents should be awarded their attorney fees and 




STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Supreme Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court 
when it reviews an order for summary judgment. Lattin v. Adams Cnty., 149 Idaho 497, 500, 236 
P.3d 1257, 1260 (2010). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho 
Dairymen's Ass 'n v. Gooding Cnty., 148 Idaho 653, 656, 227 P.3d 907,910 (2010) (quoting 
I.R.C.P.56(c)). 
The burden is on the movant to show that no genuine issues of fact exist. Vreeken v. 
Lockwood Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 101,218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009). "Disputed facts should 
be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from the record are to be drawn in favor ofthe non-moving party." Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 
Idaho 609,613,238 P.3d 209,213 (2010). 
Ifthere is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question oflaw remains for review by 
the Court. Indian Springs LLCv. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737,746,215 P.3d 457, 
466 (2009)). The Idaho Supreme Court freely reviews questions oflaw. Vavold v. State, 148 





Appellants argue that the District Court misconstrued this Court's decision in City of 
McCall V. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009 in finding that Appellants' claims against 
Respondents were barred under the applicable statute of limitation. The underlying premise of 
this appeal is Appellants' claim that because "objective proof' of Respondents' "actionable 
negligence" did not exist until at the earliest, the issuance of the Order on March 11, 2008 the 
Statute of Limitation could not begin to run before that date. See Appellants' Brief, p. 7. Put 
another way, Appellants assert that they could not have filed a lawsuit against Respondents prior 
to the entry of the Order. Therefore, the statute oflimitation could not have commenced before 
March 11,2008. I 
In setting forth their argument that "they didn't have a claim" until Judge Williamson's 
Order, Appellants purportedly rely on the case of Buxton, supra - the case they claim the District 
Court misapplied to the facts of this case. To fit within the confines of Buxton Appellants assert 
that they had to have their claim "adjudicated" in the Underlying Litigation to trigger the 
commencement of the statute of limitations. 
The first flaw in Appellants' argument is that Judge Williamson's opinion did not serve 
as an "adjudication" within the meaning assigned to that term in applicable cases decided by this 
Court. 
I In the Order, Judge Williamson held there was an issue of fact regarding the timing in which 
the earnest money had to be refunded to Appellants by Quasar: a question of fact as to what 
was a "reasonable time" was for the refund. See the Order, p. 6. 
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The second flaw in Appellants' argument is their claim that Buxton supports the 
unqualified position that a party must have their claim adjudicated in the underlying case in order 
to trigger the statute of limitation for a claim of attorney malpractice. 
Finally, if the Court correctly accepts that the statute oflimitation began to run on the 
date Quasar refused to refund the earnest money to Appellants, or July31, 2007, and the Order 
gave them "notice" on March 11, 2008, that they had an actionable claim against respondents, 
Appellants still had 16 months to file their Complaint against Respondents. Appellants' 
inference that they could not have filed a claim against Respondents because they didn't know 
they had one, is somewhat disingenuous. From the date they admit they knew they had a claim 
against Respondents, they had 16 months to file and they failed to do so. Therefore, their claim 
is barred. 
A. Appellants Incorrectly Apply Controlling Case Law As To When The Statute Of 
Limitations Begins To Accrue In A Claim For Attorney Malpractice. 
Respondents do not dispute, that in certain cases a determination of when "some 
damages" accrue will depend upon outcome of certain litigation, but those cases, as recognized 
by this Court, are fact specific. Where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the 
outcome of a lawsuit (such as the facts in this case), the statute oflimitations begins to accrue. 
See Buxton at 662, 201 P.3d at 635. There are instances where some damage accrues without 
litigation. 
A clear reading of Buxton does not support Appellants' interpretation and/or application 
of that case's holdings. There were two distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall 
sued its attorneys based on allegations of negligent advice. Two counts ofthe City's complaint 
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were based on allegations of negligent advice by the City's attorney pertaining to tennination of 
a contract and the withholding of certain payments to contractors. This Court held that until 
there was an outcome of the litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract claims, 
there could not be a detennination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the 
litigation (i.e. no breach of the contract) and arguably suffered no damage. Id., 146 Idaho at 663, 
201 P.3d at 636. 
The remaining claim of negligence in Buxton had to do with the City attorney advising 
the City to release a lien against J-U-B Engineering. This Court held that the date on which the 
City of McCall released its lien was the date on which the damage occurred because that was the 
date on which the City of McCall lost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. Id. 
at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. 
This is not a case like Buxton, where attorneys advise the client to take a certain course of 
action and a resulting trial renders the client liable to a third party and awards damages against 
the client and in favor of the third party. This is a case where Appellants claim that Respondents 
negligently drafted a document and as a result of that negligence, they suffered damages. In this 
case, the Order was not detenninative of any alleged negligence on the part of Respondents or 
any party nor did it award damages to any party. Judge Williamson did not find that "but for" 
the draftsmanship of the Agreement Quasar did not have to pay within a reasonable time. Judge 
Williamson found that Quasar had to pay within a reasonable time, but there was only a question 
of fact what "reasonable time" meant in tenns of specific training. 
This District Court's ruling in this case is entirely consistent with Buxton. The District 
Court found that Appellants suffered some damage when Quasar refused to refund the earnest 
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money upon demand. The Order entered by Judge Williamson had no effect on the damage that 
Appellants had already suffered. The damage was done. 
The facts of this case are more closely in line with Elliot v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918 
P.2d 592 (1996) and Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 Idaho 480,95 P.3d 631 (2004). 
In Elliot v. Parsons, the attorney drafted documents for the Elliots associated with the 
sale of their business to purportedly obtain favorable installment sales tax treatment. Later, the 
Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S") audited the Elliots, concluded that the transactions did not 
qualify for installment tax treatment and provided notice to the Elliots that a substantial amount 
of taxes was still owed. !d. at 724, 918 P.2d at 593. Thereafter, the Elliots hired an attorney to 
appeal the I.R.S decision. In ascertaining when the Elliots incurred some damage, this Court 
held it was when the Elliots were assessed unpaid taxes, and when they had to pay an attorney 
pursue the appeal- not when their appeal was finally denied by the I.R.S. !d. Similar to this 
case, only when Quasar refused to immediately refund the earnest money did Appellants suffer 
some damage, and thereafter when Appellants had to expend substantial attorney fees and costs 
to collect their earnest money. 
In Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, the attorney failed to file a U.C.C financing 
statement in connection with a lease and purchase agreement he had drafted for his client. The 
purchaser under the agreement made payments for several years, but then filed for bankruptcy 
and the client was not secured with the U.C.C. filing. This Court, in applying the "some 
damage" rule, held that the seller did not suffer some damage until the purchaser defaulted on 
payments under the agreement. Similar to this case, Appellants did not suffer some damage 
when the act of negligence allegedly occurred - when the Agreement was negligently drafted. 
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Appellants suffered some damage when Quasar refused to refund their earnest money upon their 
demand. And again, also suffered some damage when they incurred attorney fees having to 
pursue collection ofthe earnest money from Quasar through settlement efforts and then 
litigation. 
Buxton does not support Appellants' argument that because "objective proof' of 
Respondents' "actionable negligence" did not occur until entry of the Order, that the statute of 
limitations did not commence. As analyzed in more detail below, the statute oflimitations does 
not commence only when a party realizes they might have a claim against their attorney. Rather, 
it commences when they suffer some damage as a result of the attorney's alleged negligence. 
These are mutually exclusive inquiries, and one is not necessarily relevant to the other. 
The statute of limitations applicable to attorney malpractice claims does not have a 
discovery exception: it is not material when a plaintiff discovers he might sue his or her 
attorney, but rather when "some damage" occurs as a result ofthe alleged negligence. See 
Lapman v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d 396 (2002). In this case, it was when Quasar did not 
refund the earnest money upon demand and when Appellants expended substantial attorney fees 
and costs attempting to collect the earnest money. 
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B. The Order Did Not Constitute Damage To Trigger The Statute Of Limitations. 
Judge Williamson's ruling did not cause Appellants any damage. Appellants' claim that 
until the Order was issued they didn't know they had a claim against Respondents' does not get 
them where they need to go.2 
This Court has made it very clear that "[t]he standard of 'objectively ascertainable' 
damage does not mean that the fact of damage must have been known to the injured party, or that 
it must have been ascertainable from facts known by the injured party." Stewart, 137 Idaho at 
586,51 P.3d at 400. In Stewart, supra, Stewart represented Lapham in a loan closing. Lapham 
instructed Stewart to disperse the loan proceeds incrementally and upon his approval. Stewart's 
secretary instead paid all proceeds to the borrower upon closing. Sometime later, borrowers 
defaulted. This Court held that some damage occurred when the funds were dispersed without 
Lapham's consent Lapham could have sued Stewart to recover the finds when he wrongfully 
dispersed them. "The fact that the borrower may have repaid the funds in the future would not 
toll or delay the running of the statute oflimitations. Id. "The mere hope that the loss may be 
recovered from another party in the future does not toll the statute of limitation for malpractice in 
the future." Id.3 
2 
3 Appellants' assertion that they "didn't know" Quasar's refusal to pay might be due to 
the language contained in the Agreement is a red herring. That Appellants were not aware of the 




Appellants state that "[ w ]hile Reynolds had some risk before the judge's ruling, they 
continued to have risk after the ruling, albeit somewhat diminished." Appellants' Brief, pg. 
12 (emphasis added). Appellants' arguments pertaining to the stages and quantity of risk are 
irrelevant to the issue before the Court on this appeal, they do not create an issue of material fact 
that Appellants suffered actual damage well prior to the entry of the Order. 
Appellants claim that the facts of this case fall squarely into the Masingill, which held 
that risk alone is not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitation. Id. Appellants assert that 
before the Order was issued, there was only "the risk" of no refund and after the ruling there was 
in increased risk. But Appellants do not properly apply the holding in Masingill and miss the 
mark on when damages were incurred in this case. 
As set forth above, in Masingill, this Court found that the failure to file a security 
instrument did not constitute some damage, that it was not until the debtor failed to pay and the 
plaintiff had not security that "some damages" were incurred for the purpose of triggering the 
statute of limitation. That is, the debtor may have paid off the debt and plaintiff suffered no 
injury. In this case, Respondents allegedly failed to specify the time in the Agreement in which 
refund of the earnest money was to be made. Then, Quasar refused to refund Appellants' their 
earnest money. The facts of this case fall squarely within the facts of Masingill but not in the 
way Appellants attempt to make them fit. This is not a case about Appellants' risk. Quasar 
actually refused to pay. The issue of risk was moot upon Quasar's refusal to pay and continued 
refusal to pay, prior to entry of the Order. 
Appellants go on to assert that "[i]fthe Trial Court had decided both issues as requested 
by Law Firm (principal, interest, pre-judgment interest and attorney's fees), Reynolds would 
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have been made whole ... no possible damage. But they were left with potential damage." 
Appellants' Brief, p. 13. This statement ignores the undisputed fact that prior to the issuance of 
the Order, Appellants' had already been damaged. Moreover, in addition to Quasar's refusal to 
refund the earnest money upon demand on July 31, 2007, Appellants began to incur substantial 
attorney fees and costs on or about that date due to Quasar's refusal, as Respondents commenced 
with continuous communications with counsel for Quasar regarding the Appellants' continued 
demands for the refund including drafting settlement documents. Appellants then filed the 
lawsuit to collect the earnest money payment on September 25,2007, after the failed settlement 
efforts - all of which resulted in Appellants' incurring substantial attorney fees. 
Appellants next attempt to analogize this case to Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 
P.2d 63 (1985). In Veigel, accountants negligently prepared plaintiffs' tax returns and listed 
certain items as deductible that were not in fact deductible from 1976 through 1980. The 
plaintiffs in Veigel were not aware of the defects in the returns until July 1982, at which time 
they fired Veigel. The trial court held that the damage occurred when the tax returns were filed. 
Id. at 175, 706 P.2d at 64. This Court held that the "tortious negligence is continuing in nature 
until the plaintiffs suffer damage." Id. at 179, 706 P.2d at 68. No damage was suffered until the 
tax return was challenged by the Internal Revenue Service and an assessment made. Appellant 
reasons that "had the tax returns never been audited no loss would have been suffered and 
plaintiffs-appellants would have had nothing to gain from filing suit." Appellants' Brief, p. 13, 
citing Veigel at 178, 706 P.2d at 67. The facts of this case are in no way similar to the facts of 
Veigel. The assessment in Veigel is equivalent to Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money. 
- 12 -
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This Court's ruling in Veigel only supports the correctness of the District Court's ruling in this 
case. 
Appellants' theory still misses the mark. If Quasar would have paid upon demand it 
would have been a "no harm no foul" scenario. Even if Judge Williamson had ruled that Quasar 
had to pay the whole amount and should have paid it on demand - it does not negate the fact 
that Quasar didn't refund the earnest money when originally demanded to do so, and 
continued to refuse to refund the earnest money, requiring Appellants to file litigation to collect 
the earnest money. Appellants' had been damaged prior to filing the litigation and prior to the 
issuance of the Order. 4 Quasar's stated basis for not refunding immediately was that they were 
not required to under the terms of the Agreement. See Order p. 6 ("Defendant counters that 7(a) 
does not state a specific time for paying the refund, and therefore performance must merely 
occur in a reasonable time").5 
Appellants do not dispute that they were damaged by Quasar's failure andlor refusal to 
refund the earnest money. Quasar's failure to pay when the payment was demanded is 
ascertainable damage, notwithstanding Appellants' attempts to persuade the Court otherwise. 
Appellants' arguments convolute the issues before the Court. The Order did not damage 
Appellants or trigger the running of the statute oflimitations. Appellants focus on when they 
purportedly "realized" they might have a cause of action against Respondents, claiming only 
4 Appellants cannot substantiate any claim that they were actually "damaged" by the Order. 
5 Appellants admit that there was a dispute pertaining when the earnest money had to be 
refunded prior to Judge Williamson's decision. Appellants' Brief, p. 12. 
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then could the statute of limitations begin to accrue. This is not the inquiry before the Court, nor 
should it be the finding ofthis Court. 
C. The District Court Correctly Found That The Appellants' Complaint Was Not Filed 
Within the Applicable Statute of Limitations. 
The basis of Appellants' malpractice claim is that Respondents negligently drafted the 
Agreement. Specifically, Appellants assert that the language in the Agreement did not provide a 
date certain that the $60,000 of earnest money had to be refunded to them by Quasar in the event 
the Agreement was terminated. 
When Quasar refused to refund Appellants their $60,000 earnest money payment upon 
Appellants terminating the Agreement on July 31, 2007, Appellants suffered some damage -
they expected and did not receive the funds, and the statute of limitation on their claim against 
Respondents began to accrue on that date. 
In addition, Appellants began to incur substantial attorney fees and costs on or about that 
date due to Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money, as Respondents commenced with 
continuous communications with counsel for Quasar regarding the Plaintiffs' continued demands 
for the refund which culminated in Appellants filing litigation against Quasar on September 25, 
2007 (the "Underlying Litigation").6 Appellants incurred damages in addition to the "refusal to 
refund" by Quasar - beginning July 31, 2007. 
Appellants filed that malpractice action against Respondents on March 9,2010, well 
beyond the expiration of the two year statute of limitation. 
6 Litigation was only commenced against Quasar after a settlement agreement was reached and 
not executed by Quasar. 
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Appellants' statement that they "could not have sued their attorney on that date [referring 
to July 31, 2007] because no one had established that any defect in the Agreement causing 
Quasar not to return the earnest money" is not relevant to this motion'? Again, Appellants' 
knowledge of Quasar's "reasoning" for not refunding the earnest money is not relevant to the 
issue of whether Appellants' suffered ascertainable damage to commence the applicable statute 
of limitations. When Appellants' allegedly became "aware" of the issue pertaining to the 
Agreement regarding timing, Appellants could have filed litigation against Respondents within 
the applicable statute of limitations, but they failed to do so. Specifically, the District Court 
held: 
... assuming the lawyer was negligent in drafting the contract and 
failing to provide within that contract a method for immediate 
enforcement or to require a specified time for the payment of the 
earnest money ... then the damage starts accruing when the absence 
of the language in the contract causes the Plaintiff loss. And that 
loss started when they had to start enforcing the contract. .. 
T.,p. 30, LL 12-22. (February 28,2011 Transcript). 
Appellants suffered some damage when Quasar failed or refused to refund their earnest 
money upon demand and the District Court correctly such made a finding as a matter of law. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. The District Court correctly determined 
as a matter oflaw that Appellants' claim against Respondents as a matter oflaw. Respondents 
7 Judge Williamson did not find there was a "defect" in the Agreement, she only found there 
was an issue of fact regarding the reasonable time for Quasar to refund the earnest money. 
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respectfully request that decision of the District Court to be affirmed and that Respondents be 
awarded their attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to L.C. § 12-
120(3) and other applicable law. Jtr/}, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JQ d'ay of November, 2011. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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CERTIFICAT OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _~ay of November, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true copy ofthe foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by the method indicated below, and 
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Donald W. Lojek 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
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P.O. Box 1712 
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[Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants] 
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